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Abstract
We investigate an in￿ationary overlapping generations model where house-
holds predict future in￿ation rates by running a least squares regression of
in￿ation rates or prices on their past levels. We critically examine the results
on learning equilibria obtained by Bullard (1994) and Sch￿nhofer (1999) in this
framework. They show that an increase in the money growth rate may lead
to limit cycles and endogenous business cycles. We suggest an alternative es-
timation procedure, that starts from the same perceived law of motion, but is
more sensible from an econometrician￿s point of view. We prove that for this
estimation procedure there is global convergence on the monetary steady for
a large set of savings functions. We also study, in an heterogeneous agents
framework, evolutionary competition between the two estimation procedures,
where the fraction of the population using a certain estimation procedure is
determined by its past average quadratic forecast error. Interestingly, the more
sensible estimation procedure is not always able to drive out the other estima-
tion procedure, and endogenous business cycles may still be observed in this
heterogeneous world.
Keywords: overlapping generations models, learning, endogenous business cycles, heteroge-
neous beliefs, evolutionary dynamics
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
There is a growing literature pointing out the limitations of the rational expectations
hypothesis. In particular, it has been perceived as unsatisfactory that this hypothesis
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1endows economic agents with precise information about the structure of the economy
and the beliefs of other agents as well as unbounded reasoning abilities to deal with
this information. A number of authors have suggested that the rational expectations
hypothesis still is valid as a description of long run behavior, since economic agents
learn over time and eventually arrive at a rational expectations steady state. The
rational expectations hypothesis can therefore be supported by a learning story (see
Lucas, 1976, Marcet and Sargent, 1989 and Evans and Honkapohja, 2001). In such a
learning model boundedly rational agents are generally assumed to have no structural
information about their economic environment other than time series observations
on certain economic variables. They use these observations to make inferences about
the economic environment. In his book on bounded rationality Sargent (1993, p.22)
writes: ￿We can interpret the idea of bounded rationality broadly as a research
program to build models populated by agents who behave like working economists
or econometricians.￿ Since the perceptions of agents in￿uence their behavior, the
learning feeds back into the actual realizations of economic variables. Hence, the
learning procedure itself is one of the determinants of the evolution of the economic
variables. With respect to this learning procedure Bullard (1994, p.468) states:
￿A common research question, asked increasingly often in the recent literature, is
how this learning takes place, and more importantly, if it makes any diﬀerence for
inferences from dynamic general equilibrium models whether the learning is explicitly
modeled.￿
In his interesting paper Bullard shows, in an overlapping generations framework,
that explicitly modelling agents as econometricians might create equilibrium paths
diﬀerent from the rational expectations steady state. Some of these learning equilibria
can be characterized by endogenous ￿uctuations in in￿ation rates and agents beliefs.
Moreover, Sch￿nhofer (1999) shows that chaotic learning equilibria exist.
The objective of the present paper is twofold. First, we show that the non-
convergence results of Bullard (1994) and Sch￿nhofer (1999) depend heavily on the
estimation procedure their agents use. The net eﬀect of their procedure is that agents
weight their past observations with an exponentially (over time) decreasing factor. In
other words, their agents forget quickly. But then it is not surprising that the rational
expectations steady state may not be learned. Moreover, the estimators generated
by this procedure are not consistent and do not converge to the true parameter value
as time goes to in￿nity. In fact, we will show that for an estimation procedure that is
more sensible from a statistical point of view, the steady state of the learning model is
globally stable for a large set of savings functions (including those studied by Bullard,
1994 and Sch￿nhofer, 1999). An important observation is that the perceived law of
motion is the same for both procedures, the only diﬀerence is in the way this per-
ceived law is estimated. The main point is that it is more sound from an econometric
point of view to run a regression on a stationary time series than on a nonstationary
time series. Since in the presented model agents want to predict the in￿ation rates
2and since the time series of price levels is nonstationary, the estimation procedure
should be in terms of in￿ation rates instead of price levels. The learning equilibria
are therefore driven by the estimation procedure and not by the beliefs of the agents.
In this paper we identify a diﬀerent source of complicated dynamics in this in￿a-
tionary overlapping generations framework. We are interested whether all households
will persistently use estimation procedures that do not lead to consisitent and con-
verging estimates. Therefore, the second objective of our paper is to study an envi-
ronment where both types of estimation procedures are available to the households,
and where they choose one of them on the basis of their past performance (with past
performance being measured in terms of forecasting accuracy). The main research
question then is whether the estimation procedure suggested by Bullard (1994) and
Sch￿nhofer (1999) will still be viable when a more natural procedure is available, or
whether the latter will drive out the former. We investigate this issue by employing
the Brock and Hommes (1997) model of evolutionary competition between heteroge-
neous beliefs. Surprisingly enough, we ￿nd that both rules survive this evolutionary
competition and that endogenous business cycles are still possible in this heteroge-
nous beliefs framework, albeit for a signi￿cantly smaller set of overlapping generation
economies. The intuition behind this result is that, far away from the steady state
the ￿stable￿ estimation procedure will perform better (in terms of forecast errors)
and eventually most households of future generations will use this rule, which will
stabilize the in￿ation rates. However, for in￿ation rates close to the steady state,
evolutionary pressure against the ￿unstable￿ estimation procedure will diminish and
more households of future generations will start using it, which may destabilize the
in￿ation dynamics. After this the whole story repeats.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the overlapping
generations model studied in Bullard (1994) and discusses the existence of learning
equilibria. In Section 3 a learning procedure based upon in￿ation rates is introduced
and the main stability results are given. Section 4 introduces evolutionary competi-
tion between the two diﬀerent learning procedures and Section 5 concludes.
2 Learning equilibria
We consider a standard two period overlapping generations model, with only one
commodity, where in each period a generation is born that lives for two periods. The
generation born in period t solves
max
c0,c1
U (c0,c 1) subject to ptc0 + p
e
t+1c1 ≤ ptw0 + p
e
t+1w1,
where U : IR 2
+ → IR is a strictly monotone, strictly quasi concave utility function,
c0 and c1 are consumption in the ￿rst and second period of the agent￿s life and w0
and w1 are his endowments of the commodity in these periods. Furthermore, pt is
the price of the commodity in period t and pe
t+1 is the price expected for period t+1.
3The optimization problem gives the optimal level of consumption in the ￿rst period
of the agent￿s life as a function of expected in￿ation
pe
t+1
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From now on we will assume that the savings function is twice diﬀerentiable and
positive, i.e. S (ξ) > 0 for all ξ (this corresponds to the Samuelson case, where










The only means of saving is money. The money stock Mt is controlled by the govern-
ment and grows over time to ￿nance government expenditures. The monetary policy
rule is
Mt = ϑMt−1. (2)
Combining the demand for real balances (1) with the monetary policy rule (2), we














In terms of gross in￿ation rates πt ≡
pt+1










At the monetary steady state, π∗ = ϑ,t h ei n ￿ation rate is equal to the money growth
rate.
The model is closed by specifying the way in which agents form expectations
about future in￿ation rates. Under rational expectations or perfect foresight we
have πe
t+1 = πt+1. It is well-known that for a downward sloping savings function
the monetary steady state ϑ is unstable under perfect foresight. For non-monotonic
savings functions more complicated perfect foresight dynamics, such as cycles and
chaotic ￿uctuations, may occur (see e.g. Grandmont, 1985).
The assumption of perfect foresight requires that agents exactly know the market
equilibrium equations as well as other agents￿ beliefs and are able to use this informa-
tion to compute the market clearing prices for the future. An alternative approach is
to assume that economic agents make inferences about their environment by means
1Since the savings function corresponds to an aggregate excess demand function, any continuous
function corresponds to a savings function that is consistent with utility maximization, if we would
extend the number of diﬀerent agents per generation to at least 2 (see Sonnenschein, 1973).
4of a learning procedure. Such a procedure uses time series observations to make fore-
casts about the future development of variables. Consider the following example of
such a learning procedure.
Agents believe that the in￿ation rate is constant (which is indeed the case at the
rational expectations steady state), that is, in terms of prices, they have the following
perceived law of motion
pt = βpt−1. (4)
The agents have no a priori knowledge about β, however. Bullard (1994) assumes
that agents run a least squares regression on prices in order to estimate β and that
they use this estimate to form predictions on the in￿ation rate. The least squares
regression estimate for agents born in period t, using data available through time







and hence their forecast of the in￿ation rate is πe
t = βt. Given this forecast, the








Equations (5) and (6) together form an expectations feedback system. Realized prices
in￿uence perceptions agents have about their economic environment and these per-
ceptions feed back into the actual dynamics and determine which prices will be real-
ized. The complete system (5)-(6) can be written as a recursive dynamic system by






. By furthermore de￿ning the aux-
iliary variable γt ≡ βt−1, we can write the learning model as a system of ￿rst-order
diﬀerence equations






















De￿ne the in￿ation elasticity of savings as a(π)=−π
S0(π)
S(π) . The following proposition
describes the main result on learning equilibria.
Proposition 1 (Bullard, 1994) Assume ϑ > 1 and S (.) is twice diﬀerentiable and
downward sloping. Then (7) generically undergoes a Hopf bifurcation at the monetary
steady state at that value ϑ









a(ϑ) < (>)1 the monetary steady state is locally stable (un-
stable).
It will be useful for us to investigate the details of this result a little further.


























One of the eigenvalues is equal to ϑ
−2 and hence lies inside the unit circle for
ϑ > 1. The other two eigenvalues are complex and lie on the unit circle when ¡
1 − ϑ
−2¢
a(ϑ)=1 . Moreover, the eigenvalues cross the unit circle with positive
speed as ϑ changes. The Hopf bifurcation described in the proposition leads to an
invariant closed curve around the steady state of the learning dynamics. This closed
curve can be attracting or repelling, and motion on the closed curve can be periodic
or quasi-periodic.2 Bullard (1994) calls these cycles ￿learning equilibria￿ since they
correspond to equilibria of the learning dynamics, which are not equilibria under
rational expectations. Their existence can therefore be attributed to the learning
process. If ϑ is increased further, the time series of the in￿a t i o nr a t e sc a nb e c o m e
even more complicated. Sch￿nhofer (1999) gives, for a particular set of examples,
numerical evidence for the existence of homoclinic orbits and chaos in the learning
dynamics.
Let us now try to develop an intuition for the fact that the recursive least squares
estimates do not converge to the monetary steady state. Ordinary least squares
algorithms are so-called decreasing gains algorithms. Diﬀerent observations receive
the same weights in the regression which implies that, as time goes on and the number
of observations increases, the impact or gain of individual new observations becomes




s−1.I fp r i c e
levels are bounded gt will converge to 0 which, if it does not result in convergence
to the monetary steady state, at least leads to ever smaller changes in the estimate
of β. In the present model, however, price levels are unbounded and in fact, at the
steady state they grow at a constant rate ϑ > 1. This implies that the equilibrium
value of the gain gt is strictly positive, g∗ =1− ϑ
−2 > 0. Hence, even after many
observations, one new observation on the price level may lead to a signi￿cant change
in the beliefs of the agents, which therefore keep on ￿uctuating, implying endogenous
and persisting ￿uctuations in the in￿ation rates. Notice that all observations still get
the same weight in the regression, but that the gain does not approach 0 because the
observations become larger themselves.
2If the savings function is nonmonotonic similar phenomena occur. In that case, the monetary
steady state may also lose stability through a period-doubling bifurcation. This happens at that
value ϑ
∗ of ϑ for which ϑ2−1
ϑ2+1a(ϑ)=−1
2.
6In fact, least squares learning on price levels is closely related to the adaptive
expectations rule on in￿ation rates. Adaptive expectations (Nerlove, 1958) corre-
sponds to updating the expectation in the direction of the last observation, i.e.,
πe
t+1 = πe
t + α(πt−1 − πe
t),w i t h0 < α ≤ 1. Notice that the weight α is constant,
and adaptive expectations therefore correspond to a constant gains algorithm. In-
troducing adaptive expectations into (3) yields the following second order diﬀerence
equation











Notice that the only diﬀerence between (7) and (10) is that for the latter the weight
α is constant whereas for the former it depends upon the realization of the prices.
However, if the weight in (10) equals α = g∗ =1− ϑ
−2, (10) has the same local
stability properties as (7).3 Hence, the learning scheme proposed by Bullard (1994)
turns out to be closely related to adaptive expectations. Although the weight or gain
gt in (7) is not constant, it is certainly not (monotonically) decreasing over time.
The residuals or forecast errors from the regression (5) turn out to be











With respect to these forecast errors we can make the following claim.
Lemma 2 Consider the dynamical system (7). If the economy is not converging to
the monetary steady state ϑ,w h e nϑ > 1,a n di ft h eβt remain bounded for all t,t h e n
the forecast errors (11) grow without bound.





Boundedness of the βt implies that the sequence {βt} has a converging subsequence,
a n dh e n c e ,b yt h ec o n t i n u i t yo fS,t h a tS(βt)/S(βt+n) is as close to 1 as we wish, for
appropriately chosen n = nt. Hence, since ϑ > 1, the prices pt grow exponentially,
asymptotically with rate ϑ.






− βt−1 =0 ,
3This follows from the fact that the upper 2￿2 matrix of (9) (which is the relevant part) is equal
to the Jacobian of (10) evaluated at the monetary steady state.




− βt−1 =0 ,
for all t. But then the learning model (7) implies that βt+1 = βt for all t,a n d
consequently, that βt = ϑ, contrary to the assumption that the dynamics is not at
the monetary steady state.
This lemma provides us with another intuition for the nonconvergence of the
recursive system (7): because the forecast errors grow inde￿nitely (in absolute value),
the estimates keep changing signi￿cantly, despite the fact that the weight attached
to each individual observation decreases as time goes by. Each new observation can
upset the current estimate and lead to a radical change in the estimated perceived law
of motion which, of course, is an unsatisfactory property of an estimation procedure.
Given the exploding forecast errors, and the ￿uctuations in the beliefs, agents will be
inclined to change their estimation procedure. Apart from that, it seems to be not
too sensible to run a least squares regression on an exploding time series.
3 An alternative learning procedure
In the previous section it was argued that the nonstationary nature of the price
time series may lead to endogenous and persisting ￿uctuations in in￿ation rates.
According to the perceived law of motion (4) agents believe that the systematic part
of the in￿ation rate is constant. We can rewrite (4) into the following perceived law
of motion
πt = β. (13)
Notice that the economic agents￿ perceptions underlying both (4) and (13) is that
the in￿ation rate is constant.
Now suppose agents try to learn the correct value of β in (13) by running a least
squares regression of in￿ation rates on a constant, which corresponds to averaging
























The evolution of in￿ation rates and dynamics is then described by













This updating rule is closely related to (7) and (10), the main diﬀerence lying in
t h ef a c tt h a tt h ew e i g h tf a c t o r1/t approaches 0 as t goes to in￿nity. Hence, the
8contribution of new observations will decrease over time and the stability properties
of (14) turn out to be dramatically diﬀerent from the stability properties of (7). In
an earlier version of the current paper (Tuinstra and Wagener, 2000) we showed that
the monetary steady state ϑ is globally stable under (14) for a large set of savings
functions (including those studied in Bullard, 1994 and Sch￿nhofer, 1999).
In the present version of this paper we consider a slightly diﬀerent algorithm. Note


























and this is what our agents use as a predictor for the future in￿ation rate βt+1.N o t i c e






lnπs =l nβt +
1
t
(lnπt−1 − lnβt), (15)
which corresponds to the arithmetic mean of the logarithm of the in￿ation rate
Now de￿ne xt =l nβt − lnϑ,a n dσ(xt)=l nS (ϑexp[xt]). Using (6), (15) can be
written as the following nonautonomous second order diﬀerence equation
xt+1 = xt +
1
t
(σ(xt−1) − σ(xt) − xt). (16)
The remainder of this section is devoted to analyzing the stability properties of (16).
Recall that a function σ : IR → IR is locally Lipschitz continuous,i fi ts a t i s ￿es a
Lipschitz condition on any bounded interval. In this section we show that the steady
state x =0of the dynamic system (16) is locally stable for any locally Lipschitz
continuous function σ,a n dt h a tx =0is globally stable for any function satisfying a
Lipschitz condition on IR .
The ￿rst property of our system is that, if a suﬃciently long initial segment of
the sequence {xt} is bounded then the whole sequence is bounded.
Proposition 3 Let K>2 be an arbitrary positive constant, and assume that σ :
[−K,K] → IR is Lipschitz continuous with Lipschitz constant L. Let the sequence
{xt}∞





holds, then for all t ≥ 1 we have |xt| <K .
9Proof. Introduce the increments δt+1 = xt+1 − xt, and note that rewriting the




(σ(xt − δt) − σ(xt) − xt). (18)
The idea of the proof: if all xt were, for instance, larger than zero, then using Lipschitz





For large t, the factor L/t will be smaller than unity. Inequality (19) then implies
that the sequence xt is bounded from above. However, care is needed to treat the
case that the xt change sign, and to deal with the fact that (19) only gives an upper
bound.
Set T =1 0 L +1 .N o t et h a t|δt+1| ≤ |xt+1| + |xt| ≤ 3
5K for all 1 ≤ t ≤ T − 1 by
assumption. Moreover, as a consequence of (19) and the choice of T,t h eδt+1 have





We claim that this estimate implies xt <x T−1 + 2
3K<Kfor all t.
Note generally that




1. First consider the case that xt > 0 for all t ≥ T.L e t T ≤ s ≤ t − 1 be such










j=0 δs+j < 0. Hence, the sum
Pt−T
j=0 δT+j is bounded from
above by the contribution of the ￿rst l terms, where l is such that δT+j ≥ 0 for
0 ≤ j ≤ l and δT+l+1 < 0.S i n c e|δT| < 3





























102. In the case of a sign change of xt, we argue by induction. It is assumed that
|xj| <Kfor 1 ≤ j ≤ t,a n dt h a txt < 0 and xt+j ≥ 0 for some t and j =1 ,...,n.
Then, by (18),
xt < |δt+1| ≤
L
t













Hence xt+1 < 3




3K and consequently that xt+j <Kfor all j =1 ,...,n.
The proof that xt > −K for all t ≥ T is completely analogous.
As a consequence we have
Corollary 4 Let σ : IR → IR be (globally) Lipschitz continuous with Lipschitz con-
stant L. If the sequence {xt} satis￿es (16 ) ,t h e ni ti sb o u n d e d .




But this follows from the Lipschitz condition.
In order to get some idea what types of savings functions are covered by Propo-
sition 3 let ξ = ϑexp[x] and φ = ϑexp[y]. The condition that σ(x) satis￿es a global














In particular, for φ =1this condition reads as:
S(1)ξ
−L <S (ξ) <S (1)ξ
L.
The ￿rst inequality says that S should not decrease faster than polynomially in ξ
−1
as ξ →∞ .
That the condition is quite sharp can be seen by considering σ(x)=−x−x2.T h e







where c =1− lnϑ. Note that here the exponent of ξ
−1 grows beyond all bounds.
But for this choice of σ, the unbounded series xt = t is a solution of (16). However,
also for this savings function the trajectories under (16) remain bounded for a large
set of initial conditions.
Bounded sequences have the following attractive property.
11Proposition 5 Let σ : IR → IR be continuous. Any bounded orbit {xt} of (16)
converges to 0.
Proof. Recall that 0 corresponds to the monetary steady state in the original
variables. Introduce, as before, the increment δt+1 = xt+1 − xt,a n dl e tK>0 be





We shall show that for arbitrary ε > 0, any point will move to the interval
[−2ε,2ε], and that the points in this interval cannot escape too far if t is suﬃciently
large.
Fix ε > 0.N o t et h a tσ is uniformly continuous on [−K,K], and hence that there
exists an δ > 0 such that if |δt| < δ,t h e n|σ(xt − δt) − σ(xt)| < ε.C h o o s e T>0






Let t0 >T . We ask whether it is possible that xt 6∈ [−2ε,2ε] for all t ≥ t0.S i n c e
|δt+1| < ε, points cannot move from positive to negative without going through
[−2ε,2ε], and we may restrict our attention to the case that the xt are positive (the
other case would be treated similarly).
From (20) and xt > 2ε, the following estimate is obtained:
xt = xt0 +
t−1 X
s=t0






Since the harmonic series
P
s−1 diverges, the right hand side cannot be larger than 2ε
for all t, and hence there must be a ￿rst moment in time t1 such that xt1 ∈ [−2ε,2ε].
B u tn o t et h a tt h e nf o rt>t 1,t h es t a t ext cannot escape the interval [−3ε,3ε] any
more: if |xt−1| < 2ε < |xt|,t h e n|xt| < |xt−1| + |δt| < 2ε + ε, and the next iterates
move the state back to the interval [−2ε,2ε], as can be seen by noting that from (20)
we have δt+1 < 0 for xt > ε. Similarly we have, from (18), δt+1 > 0 for xt < −ε.
Finally, we remark that if σ is of the form lnS(ϑexp[x]),w i t hS a positive savings
function, then σ has the special property that
lim
x→−∞σ(x)=l nS(0).
From this we obtain that an orbit {xt} of (16) will be bounded from below. To see
this, ￿x ε > 0,a n d￿nd K>0 such that |σ(x) − lnS(0)| < ε if x<−K.T h e nf o r
xt < −K,







12while for |xt| ≤ K we have that
xt+1 ≥ xt −
2C + K
t
≥− 2C − 2K,
where C =m a x |x|≤K σ(x).H e n c ext ≥ min(x1,−2C − 2K),a n dt h e s eo r b i t sc a n n o t
run oﬀ to in￿nity.
From these results we may conclude that our dynamic system converges to the
monetary steady state ϑ for a large set of savings functions (obviously those included
in Bullard, 1994 and Sch￿nhofer, 1999). If the in￿ation dynamics do not converge
to this equilibrium in￿ation rates diverge to in￿nity (which corresponds to autarky).
This only happens if savings decline very fast as the (expected) in￿ation rate increases.
Duﬀy (1994) studies an overlapping generations model where this autarkic steady
state is also stable under learning.
4 Competition between learning procedures
As shown above, the procedure that agents use to estimate a perceived law of motion
is pivotal for the stability properties of the full economic system. Moreover, the
endogenous business cycles studied by Bullard (1994) and Sch￿nhofer (1999) do not
result from the perceptions of the agents per se, but from the way in which these
perceptions are updated as new information becomes available. From Propositions
3 and 5 we know that these endogenous business cycles disappear when agents use
in￿ation rates, instead of price levels, to update their perceptions. Furthermore,
it can be argued that using in￿ation rates is more appropriate, because the price
series is nonstationary and should therefore not be used in a least squares estimation
procedure.
However, the fact that an estimation procedure does not seem to be sensible
from an econometrician￿s point of view or the fact that it is destabilizing does not
necessarily imply that economic agents will not use it. It is therefore important to
investigate what happens when both procedures are available to the agents, a problem
which we take up in this section. We assume that each newborn agent chooses an
estimation procedure on the basis of its past performance. In fact, the lower the
average quadratic forecast error of the predictions generated by a certain procedure,
the higher the fraction of the newborn generation that will choose this procedure. Our
objective is to study whether, in this evolutionary competition between estimation
procedures, the ￿unstable￿ procedure will be driven out. A priori, this does not have
to be the case, since the presence of this procedure may disrupt the in￿ation dynamics
to such an extent that the other estimation procedure will perform even worse.4
4This would be similar to the theoretical ￿nding that on ￿nancial markets so-called ￿noise traders￿
cannot be driven out by rational investors, see De Long, Shleifer, Summers and Waldmann (1990).
13We follow the framework developed in Brock and Hommes (1997) for analyzing
evolutionary competition between estimation procedures. There are two types of
agents, those using prices to estimate future in￿ation rates (index 1), as discussed in
Section 2, and those using past in￿ation rates (index 2), as discussed in Section 3.
The fraction of agents of type 1 o ft h eg e n e r a t i o nb o r ni np e r i o dt is denoted by nt.


























ntS (β1t)+( 1− nt)S (β2t)
, (21)
where β1t = pe
1,t+1/pt and β2t = pe
2,t+1/pt, are the expected in￿ation rates of type
1 and type 2 agents, respectively, which evolve according to (cf. equations (5) and
(15))
















Before introducing evolutionary competition between the learning procedures let us
consider the case where the fraction nt is ￿xed and exogenously given.
Lemma 6 Consider the model given by (21) and (22), where the distribution of
agents over learning procedures is ￿xed, i.e. nt = n for all t. Assume furthermore
that the savings function is positive but monotonically decreasing in the in￿ation rate





Proof. As long as in￿ation rates are bounded, β2t will converge to the monetary
steady state ϑ (this follows, for example, from (12)). Our model can therefore be
approximated by the autonomous three-dimensional dynamic system
βt+1 = βt + gt
•
ϑ
nS (γt)+( 1− n)S (ϑ)












nS (γt)+( 1− n)S (ϑ)





14It is easily checked that the eigenvalues of the associated Jacobian matrix are complex





Clearly, a decrease in the fraction n of type 1 agents generates local stability of
the monetary steady state for a larger set of savings functions and money growth
rates ϑ.
Now we will endogenize nt by assuming that the households from a newborn
generation base their choice for the estimation procedure upon the past performance
of these procedures. The appropriate performance measure is the average quadratic
forecast error, since this is what agents are actually trying to minimize with their
least squares algorithms.5 The (negative of the) average quadratic forecast error for








wit,i =1 ,2. (23)
The relationship between w1,t+1, w2,t+1 and the fraction nt+1 is modelled as follows.
We assume that each household i of the newborn generation can be identi￿ed by
ap a r a m e t e rεi, which is distributed according to a distribution F,w i t hm e a n0.
This parameter εi measures household i￿s preference for (or bias towards) estimation
procedure 2. T h i sh o u s e h o l dt h e nc h o o s e sr u l e1 if and only if the performance of
rule 1 is signi￿cantly higher than that of rule 2,t h a ti s ,i f




where η is a measure of the dispersion of the bias, in the sense that as η increases the
bias toward rule 2 is distributed more tightly around 0. Moreover, as η approaches
+∞, all households always choose the estimation procedure with the lowest average
quadratic forecast error. Assuming that there are many households in each generation
a n du s i n gal a wo fl a r g en u m b e r sa r g u m e n tt h ef r a c t i o no ft h en e w b o r ng e n e r a t i o n
using rule 1 is then given by
nt+1 =P r
‰





=1− F (η (w1,t+1 − w2,t+1)).
In the rest of this paper we will take the logistic distribution for F which gives us
(for a discussion see Brock and Hommes, 1997)
nt+1 =
1
1+e x p[ η(w2,t+1 − w1,t+1)]
, (24)
but other choices give qualitatively the same results. The parameter η is sometimes
called the intensity of choice and measures how sensitive agents￿ choice of learning
5Alternatively, we could let the choice of estimator depend upon the realized utility from the
savings decision. This, however, has no qualitative in￿uence upon our main results.
15procedure is with respect to diﬀerences in forecasting accuracy. In fact, as η ap-
proaches in￿nity all households of the current generation will choose the estimation
procedure with the best forecasting accuracy in the past. The parameter η therefore
serves as a measure of the level of ￿rationality￿ in the choice of learning procedure.
Furthermore, if learning procedures perform equally well, agents will be distributed
evenly over the learning procedures, i.e. nt = 1
2. Note the timing of the process. When
a new generation is born in period t +1the last price it observes is pt and the last
in￿ation rate it observes is πt−1. The fraction nt+1 is determined by quadratic forecast
errors, and the last observed forecast error therefore corresponds to βi,t−1 − πt−1.
Combining (23) and (24) gives
nt+1 =
1


























The full evolutionary model is now given by equations (21), (22) and (25). The










. Note that this
is a nonautonomous dynamic system. As a ￿rst approximation we consider the au-
tonomous system with β2t = ϑ for all t and αt = α > 0 for all t,w h e r eα is taken
to be suﬃciently close to 0. A local stability analysis of the monetary steady state
reveals the following.
Proposition 7 Assume the savings function S is decreasing and strictly positive.
Consider the evolutionary model given by equations (21), (22) and (25) with β2t = ϑ
for all t and αt = α for all t. Let the savings function be positive and monotonically




a(ϑ) < 2. (26)
Proof. Let β2t = ϑ and αt = α for all t. After introducing auxiliary vari-
ables mt = nt−1 and γ1t = β1,t−1 we have a ￿ve-dimensional system of ￿rst order
autonomous diﬀerence equations. The Jacobian matrix of this dynamic system, eval-
uated at the steady state (β
∗
1,γ∗




































00 0 1 − α 0


































−2,￿ 4 =1− α and ￿5 =0 .








Observe that the local stability condition (26) is independent of the value of α.
Also note the relation with condition (8) from Proposition 1 which characterises lo-
cal stability in the case that only the type 1 estimation procedure is available. The
interpretation underlying Proposition 7 is the following: if in￿ation rates converge to
the monetary steady state, both types of forecasts will be correct and the fraction
nt will converge to 1
2. However, if the monetary steady state is unstable when n
is ￿xed at 1
2 (apply Lemma 6 for n = 1
2) the autonomous dynamic system will be
locally unstable at the monetary steady state ϑ. This same mechanism applies to




t and αt = 1
t.
Moreover, in the long run the behavior of the nonautonomous system is very similar
to the behavior of the autonomous system with α small. Also note that, although
instability of the steady state is still possible under evolutionary competition between
the learning procedures, this instability occurs only under a subset of savings func-
tions and money growth rates for which instability arises in the original model. The
introduction of type 2 agents therefore indeed tends to stabilize the in￿ation and
learning dynamics.
Let us consider a typical numerical simulation to illustrate the global dynamics
of the model. We use an example from Bullard (1994), where the savings function






endowments w0 =1and w1 =0and 1
2 < ρ < 1.T a k i n gρ = 3
4, the savings function






From Proposition 1 we immediately ￿nd that, if all agents are of type 1 (i.e. nt =1




3 ≈ 1.366.O n
the other hand, if nt is determined by past performance, as in (25), the steady state
is locally stable for ϑ < 2, as can be seen from applying Proposition 7. Simulation
r e s u l t sf o rt h ec a s ew i t hϑ =2 1
2 and η =3are shown in Figures 1 and 2.
The attractor in Figure 1 shows the long run behavior of the in￿ation rates for
ϑ =2 1
2 and η =3 .I n ￿ation rates move quasi-periodically over an invariant closed



























Figure 1: Attractor for the evolutionary model with ϑ =2 1
2, η =3and CES utility
function with ρ = 3
4.
c u r v e .F i g u r e2s h o w st h et i m es e r i e sf o rt h ef o r e c a s t sβ1t and β2t and the fraction
nt. These time series provide a nice illustration of the mechanism underlying the
global dynamics. When in￿ation rates are far away from the monetary steady state,
as in the ￿rst 10 periods, predictor β2 is much more accurate than β1.T h i sd e c r e a s e s
nt as can be seen in the lower panel of Figure 2. The decreased fraction of type
1 agents stabilizes the in￿ationary dynamics. However, as in￿ation rates converge
to the monetary steady state, there is no evolutionary pressure against β1 and the
fraction of type 1 agents will increase again, until nt has taken a value such that
the in￿ation rates become unstable (it follows from Lemma 6 that for ϑ =2 1
2 the
critical value of n is given by nc = 19
45 ≈ 0.4222) and the story repeats. Eventually
the fraction nt converges to b n ≈ 0.4248. At this value of n the in￿ation rates and the
forecasts of learning procedure 1 move over an invariant closed curve. Note that the
fraction nt converges because it is determined by the average forecast errors which
converge as long as they are bounded.
Qualitatively similar results are obtained for simulations with diﬀerent savings
functions, parameter settings and\or initial conditions, although the transient be-
havior might be a little diﬀerent.6 Also, the behavior of the autonomous system
6Depending on the parameter values and the initial conditions, the transient behavior of the
system might be quite long (this happens for example for high values of η).












































Figure 2: Timeseries for the evolutionary model with ϑ =2 1
2, η =3a n dw i t hC E S
utility function with ρ = 3
4.
with β2t = ϑ and αt = α is similar to the behavior of the nonautonomous model in
particular for small values of α. In all these examples nt converges to a value below
1
2.
5C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
Departing from the theory of rational expectations introduces in￿nitely many degrees
of freedom in modelling agents￿ beliefs. This ￿wilderness of bounded rationality￿ can
be restricted by considering agents that, if not unboundedly rational, at least are
trying to be ￿sensible￿ in predicting the future development of economic variables.
That is, they should have a perceived law of motion that is reasonable, in some sense,
and they should use the proper econometric techniques to estimate this perceived law
of motion. The learning equilibria obtained by Bullard (1994) and Sch￿nhofer (1999),
however, are partly obtained from a somewhat misguided application of econometric
techniques, that is, a regression is applied on a nonstationary price time series. In this
p a p e rw eh a v es h o w nt h a tam o r er e a s o n a b l ee s t i m a t i o nt e c h n i q u e( e s t i m a t i n gt h e
perceived law of motion on the basis of the stationary time series of in￿ation rates)
induces convergence to the monetary steady state. Recall that the perceived laws of
motion and therefore agents￿ beliefs are the same for both models. Therefore, these
19learning equilibria are not the result of modelling agents as econometricians per se,
but they are the result of modelling the agents as naive econometricians.
Another approach to discipline the ￿wilderness of bounded rationality￿ is to con-
sider an evolutionary competition between the diﬀerent types of beliefs, and then let
this competition decide which estimation procedures will eventually be used. Ap-
plying such an evolutionary competition to the two learning procedures discussed in
this paper shows that none of the learning rules will be driven out. This result can
be explained by observing that at the steady state both learning procedures gen-
erate the same forecasts, and their performance will therefore be the same. At this
steady state, therefore, there is no evolutionary pressure against the less sensible rule,
but its presence may nevertheless destabilize the in￿ation rate dynamics and causes
endogenous business cycles to emerge.
I nt h i sp a p e rw eh a v ei d e n t i ￿ed a new route to endogenous ￿uctuations in over-
lapping generations models. First we argued that in a homogeneous world, where all
agents use the same estimation procedure, it does not seem to be reasonable to as-
sume that they all use a procedure which uses nonstationary data, leads to exploding
forecast errors and generates inconsistent and nonconverging estimators. Second, in
a heterogeneous world, some agents might use such a procedure whereas others do
not. As was established in the previous section, an evolutionary competition between
the diﬀerent rules might then, in a very natural way, lead to endogenous ￿uctuations.
The goal of this paper has not been to provide a counter-example to possible in-
stability of learning models (Wenzelburger, 2002, for example, discusses for the same
overlapping generations framework another learning process with nice stability prop-
erties). In fact, we saw in Section 4 that learning processes may lead to endogenous
business cycles. However, the underlying mechanism driving these business cycles is
diﬀerent from that in the original model of Bullard (1994) and certainly more robust.
Other examples of learning models that might lead to endogenous ￿uctuations are,
for example, provided by Hommes and Sorger (1998) and Tuinstra (2003). In these
models the perceived law of motion of the agents converges to some limit belief and
given this limit belief prices keep ￿uctuating over some nontrivial attractor.
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